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Introduction
Being prepared for emergencies is not a new concept. At every level of government
there are contingency plans for natural disasters, accidental catastrophes, local
events and personal emergencies of every conceivable manner. Organizations from
the Red Cross to the Federal Emergency Management Agency to hospital emer-
gency departments are in a constant state of readiness. Often, regionally specific
plans are in place based on expectations of particular kinds of disasters: earth-
quakes in the West, hurricanes on the East Coast, tornados in the Midwest. In fact,
long before 9/11, even terrorism had been on the minds of at least a handful of stal-
wart preparedness experts – mostly in the military and in special governmental
agencies (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Stern, 2003; Clarke, 2004).
Yet the attacks of 9/11 on New York City,Washington, DC, the downing of a hijacked
passenger airliner in Pennsylvania and the many events that followed have radically
changed our perceptions and expectations of what it means to be prepared for emer-
gencies. The USA can be seen as undergoing a societal and political transformation of
major proportions, similar in many ways to the Great Depression or the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, as two examples of transformational events of the last century.
And, as if to emphasize this transformation, the terrible events of 9/11 were 
followed by other tragedies, marking just the beginning of a series of traumatic expe-
riences that have, collectively, affected the nation in a profound, multi-dimensional
way. Hard on the heels of the 9/11 attacks, in the fall of and into the Winter 2001, we
confronted the still unexplained anthrax attacks, followed by sniper shootings in the
Washington, DC region, and then the prospect of needing to vaccinate the entire
country against smallpox. Meanwhile, terrorist attacks continue to occur regularly
across the globe, while suicide bombings remain dramatically frequent in the
Mideast and have now spread to other areas such as Russia. Adding further to the
stress, the USA is engaged in major military incursions in Afghanistan and Iraq, with
continuing terrorist actions against troops and civilians.
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Future terrorist attacks seem virtually inevitable. Attacks with unconventional
weapons, such as biological or chemical agents, have been widely discussed. The
prospect of bioterrorism, and other non-conventional means of attack, raises
unprecedented levels of anxiety among people who believe such means might well
be used indiscriminately against civilians. Clearly, the idea of terror is to create
extreme levels of psychological stress (Susser et al., 2002). The prospect of shadowy
foreign nationals using deadly violence against civilians, with or without the so-
called “weapons of mass destruction”, produces precisely the kind of stress that
makes individuals and communities vulnerable to the psychological consequences
of terrorism, either actual or anticipated.
Through all of this, the nation is attempting to develop a massive new capacity
to prevent, fight and respond to terrorism, of any type, on American soil or against
US interests abroad. Internationally driven terrorism is now an irrefutable fact of
life in the USA and the response to terrorism and the threat of terrorism will
require both technical and psychological strategies.
On the technical side, there will be a full range of programs designed to coordi-
nate better protection and prevention under the rubric of “homeland security”.
Where and how this goes will be discussed later. But the players on this field will be
on relatively familiar ground. Members of the intelligence communities, military
and academic experts, first responder systems, public sector agencies, and the like
will have roles in presumably developing and engaging new technologies, creating
better means of communications and ensuring that a properly trained disaster
workforce is at the ready.
But, on the psychological and societal fronts we will need to face an entirely dif-
ferent set of challenges. It is in these matters that a new agenda, and perhaps a new
lexicon, will emerge over the next few years. This is because the nation is con-
fronting a series of realities that, collectively, represent a truly transformational
development for the country at large, for its government and for all of its citizens.
There are actually few events in recent American history that provide lessons or
a sociological roadmap with respect to how America responded to 9/11 and where
it needs to go in the future. Even though smaller terrorist attacks have occurred in
the USA in the past, including the bombing of the same World Trade Center Tower
in 1993, and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in
1995, there is little to compare to the catastrophic impact that rocked the nation 
in 2001.
There have been other such occurrences in US history where an unanticipated
trauma caused a sudden, extraordinary disruption of business as usual, but these
have been rare, especially in the last century. In the 19th century, the Civil War was
wrenching for the nation, still in its infancy and prior to its first centennial cele-
bration. But in the 20th century, one is drawn to the analogy between the attacks
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on Pearl Harbor, drawing the USA into World War II, and the terrorism of 9/11, as
perhaps the closest parallel. On December 6, 1941, Americans were certainly aware
of the German aggression in Europe and a sense of a growing threat in Asia from
Japan, a nation clearly preparing for an expanding war. Yet there was little public or
political agreement around the possibility of American engagement on either
front. Isolationism was a viable and popular perspective in response to substantial
turmoil and military confrontation in other parts of the world. But the events of
Pearl Harbor virtually stopped the arm-chair deliberation among Americans with
respect to the nation’s proper role in a world increasingly at war. That surprise
attack had extraordinary and epochal consequences for America. In an immediate
sense, war was declared by the USA against aggressors in Europe and Japan. The
entire country became mobilized both in terms of military response and what
amounted to a virtual upending of the national economy. Beyond the obvious, how-
ever, was a transformation of the country and its citizens from a heterogeneous,
though internationally isolated, nation still recovering from the great economic
depression of a decade or so earlier to a suddenly united, invigorated protagonist
in one of the great wars in all of history. Clearly American society was fundamen-
tally different, on many levels, in 2001 than it had been 60 years earlier. Yet there are
striking similarities between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the terrorist assaults of
9/11. As in 1941, the attacks of 9/11 were a stunning and horrific surprise to
Americans. Both were conceived and carried out by foreign nationals without clear
provocation, against targets not generally thought to be particularly vulnerable. At
the moment of the attacks, the country was, in both instances, in a relatively isola-
tionist geopolitical frame of mind. Both instances disturbed long-standing com-
placency and galvanized the country. In addition, the elements of surprise and
unpredictability were common to both Pearl Harbor and 9/11. Surprise, and the
psychological stress it causes, is one of the most potent allies of the terrorist.
The future of preparedness: challenges and strategies
It is no surprise, then, that bioterrorism, and the other non-conventional means of
attack, raises unprecedented levels of anxiety among people who believe such means
might well be used indiscriminately against civilians. So the question of how prepared
are we to respond to a bioterror attack, or to other types of unconventional attack, is
a reasonable and urgent issue for the public. After all, in a post-9/11 world, none of
this is out of the question as a future scenario of increased aggression against the USA.
Three years after 9/11, although some significant progress has been made, there
is still no cohesive national plan for ensuring optimal preparedness in the USA. In
the absence of a national domestic security and response plan, it is difficult to
understand the goals or establish working benchmarks for accountability at the
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level of the implementing agencies. The development of such a plan would be a
crucial initial step in working towards a better-prepared nation. In order to estab-
lish an appropriate national blueprint there needs to be a realistic assessment of
risk and vulnerabilities, new ways of organizing and coordinating critical intelli-
gence and interdiction strategies, clear definitions of “functional preparedness”,
thorough analysis of estimated costs and appropriation of sufficient resources.
Virtually none of this has yet happened to a sufficient degree.
We will consider below a number of the elements that we consider essential in
developing our preparedness strategies.
Define “prepared” and establish preparedness benchmarks
One of the most difficult challenges will be defining what is meant by “prepared”,
especially for terrorism. There is no functional definition of “preparedness” that is
consistent throughout government or that is universally accepted by departments of
public health, first responders or healthcare systems around the nation. Should a
community need the ability to respond to an intentionally poisoned water supply
that creates 200 or 2000 very sick people in a short period of time? Should the defin-
itive diagnosis and management protocols for such a calamity be developed by the
local health department, a state agency or the federal government? Should hospitals
in a community have the capacity to quarantine 10 patients or 100, or 10,000?
Should the community be able to decontaminate people covered with radioactive
dust at the rate of 6 an hour or 60? What equipment is needed and who needs to be
trained? Should a major city be planning for terrorist scenarios with 100,000 casu-
alties or 1 million? In addition, there is a need to understand and include the needs
of special vulnerable populations, such as children (Redlener & Markenson, 2003).
Since total preparedness is essentially not achievable, a better approach might be
to seek a goal of “functionally and appropriately prepared”. This is not simply an
academic exercise. In the absence of a definition it is virtually impossible to set
benchmarks, understand true costs or evaluate outcomes.
A personal analogy is useful. Paraphrasing an oft-stated response to the question
of what does “prepared for a terrorist emergency” mean to an individual, the
answer might be stated as “somewhere on the continuum between uninformed
complacency and overt paranoia”. For a larger system or society as a whole, the
concept of functionally and appropriately prepared may be applied similarly. Does
the nation need to prepare for simultaneous attacks with weaponized smallpox,
explosions of “dirty” bombs in six metropolitan areas and several attacks on major
infrastructure facilities? Does Chicago’s health and public health systems need to
plan for 500 or 5000 victims of a nerve gas attack? Or 50,000? There are no obvi-
ously correct answers for most of these questions. But a set of decisions needs to be
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made in order to calculate the resources needed to reach whatever level of pre-
paredness is determined to be appropriate.
Beyond the immediate necessity to define preparedness, there is a real need to
establish appropriate benchmarks in many aspects of the planning process.
Benchmarks establish a means of describing specific needs, developing cost mod-
els and enabling proper monitoring of programs and policies established as part of
the preparedness agenda.
Hospital planning illustrates these points. Even with the availability of signifi-
cant resources for emergency planning, institutions need to understand what they
are aiming toward. These questions cannot be left up to local facilities or even
entire communities to decide on their own, but require analysis and guidance from
high-level planners who can synthesize information on threat assessment, avail-
ability of emergency resources from outside the community and other key factors.
In the absence of large-scale strategic guidance in these matters, local communi-
ties, acute care facilities and public health agencies will have no way of establishing
appropriate benchmarks, quantifying need demonstrating efficacy of established
preparedness programs.
The potential scenarios are virtually limitless. The money and resources needed
for planning are entirely dependent on the scenarios selected. Furthermore, it is
impossible to test or plan for every possible scenario; therefore, the selection of sce-
narios must, by definition, represent choices about the most likely threats, or those
for which planning would prove the most generally useful.
In the USA, the call for standardization was recently embodied in Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) December 8, 2003 (White House, 2003). In
response to this directive, the Office of Domestic Preparedness in the Department
of Homeland Security is planning to develop 15 standardized scenarios for drills
and exercises, and to standardize drill evaluation criteria for all responders.
For public health and the healthcare response, there have also been some
attempts toward more specific definition and benchmarks. In public health, the
National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO, 2004), which
represents local health departments, recently began a program (in collaboration
with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and academic partners)
called “Public Health Ready” to help agencies define minimum standards of emer-
gency preparedness. Criteria are based on having an adequate plan, providing
appropriate training on emergency preparedness to staff, and then testing agency
preparedness through drills and exercises. At the hospital level, federal bioterrorism
funding to hospitals, implemented through the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) has set certain benchmarks for hospitals receiving these
funds. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO), the standard-setting organization for the USA, has also set increasing
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standards for hospital emergency preparedness, beginning with having emergency
plans and regular drills that also include the community. These are good starts, but
obviously represent only the beginning. Preparedness is a process as much as it is a
specific list of capabilities, and the endpoint still remains to be defined.
Manage the bureaucracy
Most look to the federal government for standards, but first the federal govern-
ment must get its own house in order. There is no escaping the fact that the pre-
vention of terrorism and the capacity to respond effectively to major disasters,
human made or otherwise, in a society as large and complex as the USA is a mon-
umental task, akin to mounting, and maintaining a credible and effective military.
However, the current bureaucracies responsible for managing the process of pre-
paredness, on all levels, are enormous and unwieldy. There are serious concerns
regarding the lack of coordination, even among agencies of the same department.
The principal preparedness and response functions fall to the US Department of
Homeland Security, a newly formed entity that consolidates a number of federal
agencies. Its workforce includes nearly 180,000 workers in some 23 different agencies.
Yet important management and control questions need to be urgently addressed.
Both the Congress and the White House will need to collaborate on the establish-
ment of a properly funded, cohesive system for developing and implementing
strategies. The system should expect minimization of redundancy and full
accountability from all relevant agencies.
The response to any terrorist event requires coordinating many federal agencies.
But, at the same time, emergency response is local and therefore requires local
agencies to be prepared and to work together with these numerous federal part-
ners. The blueprint for integrating response across agencies at the federal and local
levels is the recently announced National Incident Management System (NIMS).
While this is an essential first step, NIMS, like all plans, requires continual practice
by those who must use it. If past experience is a guide, communications will
remain a major challenge. The integration of response sectors is a particular issue,
including integration of healthcare, emergency medical services (AQ1EMS) and
public health, and their relationship to the “standard” regular first responders.
The proper interface between public health and other government agencies in
the post-9/11 world is another fundamental, but unanswered, question. In the age
of terrorism in America, we urgently need to define and clarify the dynamic rela-
tionship between national security and public health. In 2002, when the possibility
of vaccinating large numbers of Americans against smallpox was first raised,
experts in the health and public health communities were repeatedly asked if this
was an appropriate decision. As the eradication of smallpox in the 1970s was truly
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one of the great public health accomplishments of all time, so the return of small-
pox as a viable possible consequence of an act of terrorism was an astonishing and
disconcerting idea to contemplate. But the decision to develop a contingency plan
to deal with a smallpox outbreak should not have been a matter of the “opinion” of
public health experts. No legitimate expert in this field would ever consider such a
notion unless smallpox was considered to be a clear threat. This was in fact a deci-
sion that had to be made based on information from the national security and
intelligence communities, not public health. Public health experts would be inte-
gral in the development and implementation of a plan, but only if a serious threat of
smallpox could be convincingly established.
Monitor dual use and trade-offs
Does a massive investment in preparedness, especially in the health and public
health systems, simply shift resources and attention from the traditional or core
agendas of these systems, or do innovations related to preparedness have second-
ary beneficial effects with respect to the capacity of the system to function more
generally? Or perhaps both factors are operative in different situations and at dif-
ferent times. There is a case to be made, for instance, that enhancing surveillance
for diseases induced by biological weapons can improve mechanisms for early
identification of any infectious disease, including newly emerging naturally occur-
ring infections like severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and West Nile, or
pandemic influenza (Morse, 2002). Indeed, there is an exact historical precedent.
In 1950, during an earlier period of concern about bioterrorism, the CDC started
the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS). The EIS was intended to provide inves-
tigative and public health capacity to respond in case of a bioterrorist attack
(Langmuir & Andrews, 1952; Henderson, 1993). While it was never needed for this
purpose (before the anthrax attacks in 2001), the EIS has provided expertise for
responding to many natural disease outbreaks and has served as a major training
mechanism for generations of epidemiologists and other public health experts.
On the other hand, there is considerable concern that “terror preparedness” is
swallowing up resources that are needed to deal with the long-standing critical
issues, which still require enormous attention, by public health officials. Problems
like the spread of HIV/AIDS, control of drug-resistant tuberculosis or ensuring
access to childhood immunizations for all children, among many other challenges,
remain high priorities for the public health community.
There is evidence that resources for core programs have been eroding, especially
as state budgets have come under greater economic pressure (Gursky, 2004; Turnock,
2004). This was particularly evident during the push to vaccinate health, first
responder and public health workers against smallpox. Several health departments
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reported the need to shift personnel, originally assigned to traditional pediatric
vaccination or tuberculosis control activities, to the smallpox program (Gursky,
2004).
Over the next few years, it is imperative that non-governmental “watchdog”
organizations monitor the consequences of identifying and investing preparedness
resources. The potential for degrading vital, core public health and safety net pro-
grams is real. In addition, the sustainability of these public health funding increases
remains a concern.
Address bioethical and legal ramifications of preparedness
As we confront terrorism, protecting the public without eroding civil liberties and
our core democratic values remains an important issue in general. Virtually every
aspect of large-scale preparedness planning can evoke critical issues of ethical or
legal concern. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2002, giving broad, new investigatory
powers to domestic law enforcement officials seeking to identify or detain poten-
tial terrorists, has become a major source of concern to legal professionals and civil
liberties advocates. Serious questions have been raised regarding privacy of citi-
zens, due process and other matters central to American values, and protected by
fundamental principles of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights.
For example, in planning for managing bioterrorist attacks, governmental agen-
cies, law enforcement and public health experts are considering responses includ-
ing forced evacuation and quarantine. There is a need for systematic examination
of the legal and civil liberties implications of such measures. In fact, public health
law in general, as well as the relationships among public health, police and military
jurisdictions in these matters, is extremely unclear. Principles and governing laws
and regulations vary widely among states. Clarifying the implications of these mat-
ters with respect to large-scale preparedness planning is an essential near-term
objective (Gostin et al., 2002). In many states the process of rewriting public health
law is already in process.
Ensure future workforce
Competent and well-prepared personnel are key to any agency’s successful pre-
paredness efforts. At least one major recent report reviewed the status of the pub-
lic health workforce and noted the prospect of severe shortages in the workforce as
the current pool aged and retired (Institute of Medicine, 2003). It was predicted
that half of the current public health workforce would be lost by attrition within the
next decade. Grave concerns were raised about the capacity of the pipeline to ensure
appropriate workers to fill needed slots for public health, whether for preparedness
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or traditional public health. Clearly, an important agenda for public health train-
ing and educational institutions would be consideration of efforts to expand and
diversify existing programs.
In addition, it is likely that new programs will need to be developed. The develop-
ment of the EIS over 50 years ago, and of Project Public Health Ready in the last few
years, have already been mentioned. In the last 5 years, the CDC also established a net-
work of Centers for Public Health Preparedness to involve academe in helping to train
the public health workforce as well as to help replenish the pipeline (Morse, 2003).
National deliberation of short-term and alternative solutions would need to
include the possibility of training public health workers at the undergraduate level,
as well as graduate programs as is currently the case (Institute of Medicine, 2003).
In a similar vein, certificate programs and rapid transition of individuals in related
professions to fulfill particular public health preparedness functions would have to
be considered. Such efforts would require buy-in and support from the federal
government in order to ensure sufficient support.
Engage local communities in emergency preparedness planning
In general, we have a long way to go with community preparedness, and in engaging
the community as an essential partner in all preparedness efforts. Clearly, commu-
nity resilience is an important goal of preparedness. The response to 9/11 and other
tragedies shows that, in fact, there is a surprising amount of resilience in most com-
munities. However, with the exception of a few, minimally funded efforts, such as the
Community Emergency Response Program (AQ2CERT), there have been few efforts
to really engage citizens and local communities in the process of emergency readi-
ness. To date the entire process has been essentially “top down”. Government issues
terror alert warnings. Officials advise citizens to “be vigilant” and make plans to
accommodate a need to evacuate an area or “shelter in place”. But, general cynicism
about the government’s ability to respond effectively in the event of a bioterror attack
and a decreasing level of confidence in the health and public health system’s capacity
to provide care in the aftermath of such an event has resulted in little actual cooper-
ation or participation in emergency planning on the part of everyday citizens.
The color-coded alert system has been unhelpful in the absence of explanation
or direction regarding what people need to do in response to a change in the level
of concern. At the same time, journalists and officials have not fully come to grips
with what messages ought to be communicated to the public around terrorism and
emergency readiness. In large part, this is due to substantial absence of clarity on
this subject from government, lack of publicly trusted, consistent communicators
and a general sense that the media has not gotten a clear sense of its own mission
during this time of continuing crisis in America.
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In a 2003 Marist survey commissioned by the National Center for Disaster
Preparedness of the Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health and
the Children’s Health Fund, Americans were found to be very concerned about the
possibility of new terrorism, yet many lacked confidence in government or the
public health system’s ability to respond effectively. In a follow-up poll conducted
in July 2004, public confidence had declined even further (National Center for
Disaster Preparedness and Children’s Health Fund, 2004). While 76% of Americans
remain concerned about terrorism, only 53% expressed confidence in the govern-
ment’s ability to protect local areas, contrasted with 62% a year earlier. Even more
disconcerting was the finding that more than 63% of Americans had not made
their own basic emergency plans, and only 21% (in the July 2004 poll) considered
themselves familiar with their own community’s terrorism response plan. In fact,
in the August 2003 survey, 90% of Americans said they would not cooperate with
official directives to evacuate an area considered to be under attack. This dramatic
level of potential dissent in the time of an emergency was due to frequently expressed
concerns about the whereabouts and safety of family members and loved ones. In
other words, if parents are unsure about what’s happening with their children in a
major emergency, they will not leave an area, even if ordered to do so.
All of these suggest that individuals, and their communities, remain discon-
nected from the planning process. Work needs to begin immediately to ensure that
families take appropriate steps to improve their abilities to survive in an emer-
gency. Citizens also need to be more engaged in working on community-based
emergency plans. Research with respect to enhancing individual engagement as
well as defining appropriate roles for volunteer programs, local institutions such as
schools, neighborhood organizations, faith-based communities and the like will all
be the near-term goals in national preparedness.
However, there is still no established methodology for developing community
resilience or even for measuring it. Risk communications for pre-event messaging
remain among the key strategies, but there is little consistency in either the mes-
sages or how they are presented. It is likely that different ethnic communities will
have different trusted sources and preferred methods of receiving information.
One strategy could be identifying community leaders who are perceived as trusted
information sources in their communities, and understanding how risk informa-
tion can be presented to them for maximum clarity and usefulness.
However, this is only meaningful if consensus can be developed on what com-
munities should be doing to prepare for major emergencies. Both risk communi-
cations and community preparedness activities remain an evolving area. In the
USA, there is a long history of preparedness, including intensive efforts during the
Cold War. Many Americans of a certain age remember “duck and cover” drills and
other activities that, in retrospect, seem naïve and uninformed, an attempt to show
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that something was being done. It is possible that the experiences of these Cold
War activities have hampered our willingness to develop new civil defense measures
and to examine more constructive ways to engage the community in laying the
foundations for its own psychological defense against terror.
Efforts to engage the public are in nascent stages in the USA. Programs such as
“Ready.gov” or, in New York City, “NYC Aware”, are encouraging starts, but only first
steps. A number of other countries, such as Britain, Israel, Sri Lanka and Colombia,
have had to confront terrorist activities for a number of years, and comparisons might
be instructive. There is much to be said for demystifying preparedness and providing
individuals with tools to increase resiliency. In Israel, for example, basic emergency
preparedness lessons are presented as part of the school curriculum beginning as early
as age 6, so that children have had some time to become familiar with basic prepared-
ness concepts and to practice them. The lessons at school also encourage discussion of
these questions at home, making family discussions easier and ensuring that parents
are also confronting these questions along with their children (Boaz Tadmor, personal
communication, 2003).
Improve understanding of the psychological and behavioral 
ramifications of terrorism
The chapters in this volume survey the state of our understanding of the psycholog-
ical response to terrorism and other exigent events. It is clear that much has been
learned. At the same time, many questions remain. What are the best interventions
post-event? How do we recognize those in most immediate need, or those who may
be most susceptible, other than those with pre-existing psychopathology? (North 
et al., this volume). What sorts of pre-event messages are the most useful for prepar-
ing the community?
One unmet need is a paradigm for integrating mental health intervention into
our preparedness and response activities. For example, some hospitals in Israel
assign teams of mental health professionals in the emergency department during
major disasters. Other teams of mental health professionals are also assigned specif-
ically to work with victims’ families, and are trained to address their concerns.
There will also be a need to train response professionals to be competent in
mental health issues. There are two obvious components of mental health involved
in this. First, responders must be sensitive to mental health issues among those
they encounter during the response. They must be able to calm fears among mem-
bers of the affected community and must be able to triage quickly and refer those
who need immediate counseling. Secondly, and just as importantly, they must be
trained to recognize when they are showing signs of stress themselves and get
appropriate relief. Even today, there is widespread recognition that responders may
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be particularly vulnerable, but uncertainty remains about the best way to prevent
stress in responders (North et al., this volume).
Conclusions
These are some of the key issues needing careful attention as the nation continues
the process of preparedness for disasters and terrorism. We are moving at a level of
urgency unprecedented in a modern society. But will the resources for prepared-
ness be distributed equitably throughout our communities? Will already under-
served populations see disparities in this arena, as is already the case with traditional
health and other services? Who will monitor this potential area of concern? And,
perhaps most important, can such efforts be made sustainable?
As society ponders how far we can go in efforts to prevent or respond to terrorism,
there are difficult challenges to be faced. Can we do what is prudent and appropri-
ate, without infringing on cherished values or legal rights that are the hallmarks of
our society? We all hope so, but only time will tell.
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